CONTRACT AND CONFLICT OF LAWS:  AUTONOMY  IN CHOICE OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES by Yntema, Hessel E.
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 1 
Issue 1 NEW YORK LAW FORUM, vol 1, 1955 Article 9 
January 1955 
CONTRACT AND CONFLICT OF LAWS: "AUTONOMY" IN CHOICE 
OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 
Hessel E. Yntema 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hessel E. Yntema, CONTRACT AND CONFLICT OF LAWS: "AUTONOMY" IN CHOICE OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. (1955). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
CONTRACT AND CONFLICT OF LAWS:
"AUTONOMY" IN CHOICE OF LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
ESSEL E. YNTEMA
I. CONTRACT AS A SOURCE OF OBLIGATION
THE first principle of contract law is that contract constitutes
obligation, or, to state the principle inversely, that agreement justi-
fies claims to what is agreed. This conception has been so long and
universally rooted in both public and private law that its significance
is not always appreciated. The authority of government, once attrib-
uted to divine mandate, is now predicated upon the consent of the
governed, while the most pervasive basis of jurisdiction, as it was
also the most ancient, is submission by the parties. Nevertheless, this
rudimentary idea that it is just to hold individuals to their covenants
was the product of a long and by no means easy development in early
legal history, when the prime concern was to preserve peace and the
only available means to avoid private warfare was to induce the con-
testants to agree upon a composition. In modern times, suggestive
parallels may be found in the spheres of international or labor rela-
tions.
Roughly speaking, there were three stages in the recognition of
contract as a source of obligation. In the first, certain rituals or forms
of action became recognized to settle disputes. These were sanctioned
in various ways-by appeal to the gods, or the giving of hostages,
and eventually by the public power-and subjected those who par-
ticipated to corresponding penalties in case they violated the arbitra-
ment reached. The second stage, exemplified by the development
during the classical period of Roman law, brought liberalization of
the system of formal actions through the concept of intention-the
idea that the spirit is the essence of contract, not the letter. This
furnished a masterkey for the interpretation of the ancient forms and
statutes and made it possible to individualize private rights in re-
sponse to new conditions by means of equitable considerations, nota-
bly typified by fraud (dolus) as a ground to reject or limit formal
rights as stated in the system of actions. The third and final stage
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was accomplished by the Canon Law; the forms lost significance, ex-
cept as modes of proof, and the law of contract was generalized on
the postulate that a nudum pactum, a mere agreement, is a source of
right. This principle, pacta sunt servanda, furnished a conventional
basis for civil government, international treaty, and private right.
The immediate corollary of the principle that contract is a source
of obligation is that, absent more imperious considerations, the obli-
gations created by agreement should correspond to the terms of agree-
ment. In cases of conflict of laws, it is thus a natural inference from
the principle of contract that the law contemplated by the parties
should apply in situations where their rights are to be measured by
their agreement. As has been shown elsewhere,' this principle of so-
called "autonomy" has been widely accepted in the courts and de-
clared in the legislation of a large number of countries. Notwith-
standing this, the extent to which the laws applicable to a contract
should be governed by the intention of the parties and even the basis
on which this is to be admitted, is gravely disputed by the text writ-
ers. Jurists in the liberal tradition stress the inherent freedom of con-
tracting parties to select the law to govern their engagements, while
those who exaggerate the sovereign power of the state as the source
of law and right, while admitting the general trend, deny that the
parties can thus "legislate." In this latter view, only the state to
which the contract is subject can confer the power to "incorporate"
terms derived from a foreign law. Between these two poles of classi-
cal liberalism and authoritarian dirigisme, however, as suggested in
the survey above-cited,2 there is common ground: on the one hand,
that whatever its explanation or precise scope, the intention of the
parties is universally recognized as a significant, if not always con-
trolling, factor to select the law applicable to a contract; on the other
hand, that the principle of autonomy is subject to certain well-recog-
nized limitations. These are, briefly, that the lex fori governs ques-
tions of procedure and public policy; that questions of form and ca-
pacity are frequently decided on other principles; and that certain
types of standardized contracts, as well as purely local transactions,
are normally subject to the law within whose sphere they were con-
cluded.
1 Yntema, 'Autonomny' in Choice of Law, I Am. J. Comp. Law 341 (1952).
2 Ibid.
195]
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
Aside from the basic theoretical dispute, whether contract as such
can create rights, and the related question whether mandatory re-
quirements of law can thereby be avoided, the following aspects of
the doctrine of autonomy in choice of law appear in a degree problem-
atical: first, whether the law indicated by the parties should be other-
wise related to the transaction; second, whether more than one law
can be chosen; and third, what law is to determine any divergence in
these respects. The purpose of the present article is, in the light of
the survey previously cited,3 to review the literature in the United
States concerning the doctrine of autonomy, leaving the case mate-
rials to be analyzed on some other occasion. Admittedly, the theories
in the books must in the last analysis stand the test of judicial de-
cision, but the precedents in turn have necessarily to be assessed in
terms of the theories which they apply. To simplify matters, consid-
eration will be primarily given to the effect of express provisions in
contracts prescribing the law intended to govern. While the intention
of the parties obviously has wider significance as a criterion for
the solution of conflicts of laws--for example, in cases of tacit or
presumed intention, or arising from other types of transactions-this
more restricted approach serves to direct attention to the central
problem: how far can possible uncertainty respecting the law gov-
erning a contract be avoided by previous stipulation?
II. TRADITIONAL. VIEWS ON LAW COVERING CONTRACT
IN 1825, in Wayman v. Southard,4 which presented the first
occasion on which the Supreme Court of the United States was called
upon to construe the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, pre-
scribing that "the laws of the several States, except where the con-
stitution, treaties, or statutes, of the United States, shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at
common law, in the Courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply," Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court declared: "As
construed by the Court, this section is the recognition of a principle
of universal law; the principle that in every forum a contract is gov-
erned by the law with a view to which it is made."'
In view of this explicit declaration of the principle of autonomy
3 Ibid.
4 10 Wheat. 1 (U. S.), 6 L. Ed. 253 (1825).
5 Id. at 48, 6 L. Ed. at 264.
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in a leading decision by Chief Justice Marshall and the equally clear
enunciations to the same effect by Lord Mansfield in the celebrated
case of Robinson v. Bland (1760)6 and writers such as Huber, to
whom this branch of Anglo-American law is so deeply indebted,7 and
more particularly the acceptance and elaboration of this doctrine in
subsequent decisions of the English courts, and the concurrent recog-
nition of liberty of contract in the interpretation of the Constitution
of the United States, during an epoch when pioneer conditions favored
an economy of free enterprise, it may seem surprising that, until re-
cently, the conception that the parties may elect the law to govern
their contract has been scarcely discussed and that, in the current
literature, it is questioned by respectable authority. From this point
of view, a brief review of the leading writers is of interest.
The first work touching conflict of laws, published in the United
States, the Dissertations of Samuel Livermore,' appears to have had
no appreciable direct influence upon the development of this branch
of law. In this work, the doctrin6 of the statutes as developed by
civilians was outlined, specifically following the genial analysis of
Dumoulin, while the authority of Huber was impugned, and in par-
ticular the comity theory and his reference to the lex loci contractus
to determine capacity, which had influenced courts in England
and America. While this criticism of Huber and, more relevant to our
theme, the casual statement of Dumoulin's limited doctrine of au-
tonomy in contracts, do not seem to have been significant, the fact
that Livermore had drawn attention to the desirability of providing
uniform "fixed and correct principles" in the United States for the
determination of conflicts of laws and to the value of the extensive
Continental literature for the purpose, may well have tended, as he
6 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717, 1 Bl. W. 234, 236, 96 Eng. Rep. 129, 130
(1760). The well-known passage in Lord Mansfield's opinion is:
"'The Law of the Place can never be the Rule, where the Transaction is entered
into with an express View to the Law of Another Country, as the Rule by which it
is to be governed," (citing Huber and Voet).
"Now, here the payment is to be in England: It is an English Security and so
intended by the Parties." 2 Burr. 1077, 1078-9, 97 Eng. Rep. at 718.
' "Verum tamen non ita praecise respiciendus est locus, in quo Contractus est
initus, ut si partes alium in contrahendo locum respexerint, Me non potius sit con-
siderandus." Praelectiones, Tom. II, lib. I, tit. III, Par. 10. (In the edition of 1711,
vol. 2, p. 34).
8 Livermore, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QuEsTIoNs WHICH ARISE FROm THE CON-
TRxIUETY OF THE PosrnVE LAw oF DFnM.RENT STATES AND NATIONS (New Orleans,
1828).
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had hoped, "to excite a spirit of inquiry into a subject but little
understood in this country, and may lead to discussions, by others
more capable of accomplishing the object desired."0
In any event, the brief reference in the first edition of volume two
of Chancellor Kent's Commentaries on American Law, published in
1827, to the principle that a contract valid by the law of the place
where made is valid everywhere jure gentium, was expanded in the
second edition to ten pages devoted to "The lex loci as to contracts,"
in which reference is made to Livermore's Dissertation as "very cred-
itable to his learning and vigorous spirit of inquiry."' In this sum-
mary, subject to the principle of comity, it is "laid down as the settled
doctrine of public law, that personal contracts are to have the same
validity, interpretation and obligatory force in every other country,
which they have in the country where they were made, or were to be
executed."' To the rule of the lex loci contractus, three exceptions
are stated: first, the exception of public policy; second, the lex loci
has no application to remedies ui)on contracts; third, if a contract is
made under one government, and is to be performed in another, and
the parties had in view "the laws of such other country in reference
to the execution of the contract, the general rule is, that the contract,
in respect to its construction and force, is to be governed by the law
of the country or state in which it is to be executed."" This in sum
is the doctrine of Huber, cited along with Voet and Lord Mansfield.
In 1834, essentially the same doctrine was elaborated in the first
systematic and most influential treatise to appear in English, Justice
Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws. In this celebrated
work, in the chapter on "Foreign Contracts," a total of 115 pages in
the first edition (283 in the edition of 1841) is devoted to an ex-
haustive review, in the first instance of the civil law authorities and
secondarily of the English and American cases. The erudition and the
labor, "truly discouraging and exhausting," displayed in this recon-
ciliation of the then scattered, controversial, and indeed "repulsive,"
literature, necessary to open to the English-speaking world "a great
branch of international jurisprudence,"' cannot fail to excite just ad-
9 Id. at 20.
10 At page 455.
11 At page 458.
12 Pages 459-460.
13 1 Story, COIEUT-TARes ON THE CON ICT oF LAWS, Preface, xv (Boston,
1834).
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miration, but the comprehensive and composite formulation of the law
of foreign contracts, though intrinsically simple, was derived from a
variety of conflicting views and can scarcely be said to have advanced
consideration of the question of autonomy in choice of law. More
explicitly than Kent, Story in effect proposed a double criterion to
select the law to govern foreign contracts:
"Generally speaking, the validity of a contract is to be decided
by the law of the place, where it is made, [unless it is to be per-
formed in another country, for, as we shall presently see, in the latter
case, the law of the place of performance is to govern.] If valid there,
it is by the general law of nations, jure gentium, held valid everywhere,
by the tacit or implied consent of the parties."' 4
"The ground of this doctrine (respecting formalities), as com-
monly stated, is, that every person, contracting in a country, is under-
stood to submit himself to the law of the place, and silently to assent
to its action upon his contract. .. . It would, perhaps, be more correct
to say, that the law of the place of contract acts upon it, independ-
ently of any volition of the parties, in virtue of the general sovereign-
ty, possessed by every nation, to regulate all persons, and property,
and transactions, within its own territory."' 5
"The rules already considered suppose, that the performance of
the contract is to be in the place, where it is made, either expressly,
or by the tacit implication. But where the contract is, either expressly
or tacitly, to be performed in any other place, there the general rule
is, in conformity to the presumed intention of the parties, that the
contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation, and interpretation, is to
be governed by the law of the place of performance."'
6
To this basic dual rule that the law governing a contract is deter-
mined by the place of contracting or alternatively by the place of
performance when indicated, the same exceptions apply as stated by
Kent; among these, the exception on grounds of public policy is
particularly emphasized as comprehending contracts (a) injurious to
the national interest, (b) violative of good morals, or (c) opposed to
national policy or institutions, irrespective of what the lex loci con-
tractus may be. Additional limitations on the general principle are
stated: that contracts respecting immovables are in the last analysis
subject to the lex rei sitae and that, in the event of conflict between
the lex loci and the lex fori, the latter, as Huber had also proposed,
14 Id. 368-9, § 242 (3d ed., Boston, 1846). The reference in brackets does not
appear in the editions of 1834 and 1841.
15 Id. at 395-6, § 261.
16 Id. at 432, § 280.
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should be preferred. It is also to be noted that, while Kent, following
Lord Mansfield, would apply the law of the place of performance
when the parties had contracted with that law in view, Story would
apply the law of the place of performance on the objective ground
of their "presumed intention" that it should apply, whenever they
contracted, expressly or tacitly, for performance elsewhere.
But despite these qualifications, Story's doctrine respecting for-
eign contracts was relatively simple as compared with many of the
theories of the time; not the least of its merits was, as a general prin-
ciple, to render each contract subject to a single law. This avoided
the complications involved in independently subjecting questions of
form to the time-honored rule, locus regit actum, and capacity to the
personal law of the domicil, as in the statutory theories. At the
same time, it is clear that, in Story's system, the general princi-
ple was materially jeopardized by the large scope ascribed to the
lex Jori, anticipating later positivistic doctrines, while the liberty
of the parties to choose the law otherwise governing their contracts
was not expressly recognized, being limited to a power to specify a
place of performance and thus indirectly to select the corresponding
law instead of the law of the place of contracting as the lex loci con-
tractus. In this connection, the extensive survey of the European au-
thorities presented by Story to determine whether the parties could
select parts of each of these two laws to validate a contract, i.e.,
whether depeqage so-called is admissible, and Story's negative con-
clusion, were significant. In effect, this all but sacrificed liberty of
contract in conflicts law to territorial sovereignty.
III. FOREIGN CONTRACTS AND "SITUS"
IN passing, it might be of interest to speculate why Kent and
more especially Story, writing in a virgin continent that had a genera-
tion before vindicated its independence from European control and on
a topic of great interest to the Union, should have turned to the pre-
Revolutionary European authorities, Continental or even English, for
their inspiration. Apparently, they conceived this to be necessary to
secure uniformity in a branch of law of special importance to interna-
tional commerce. Moreover, they wrote at a time when the sans culotte
trends in the generation following Independence had been superseded
by a neo-classic revival of legal learning; they were no innovators
[VOL. I
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but faced the essentially conservative task of restating the existing
authoritative legal materials, for the most part dating from the 17th
and 18th centuries, as the basis of the common law of the United
States. What is astonishing is not that the doctrine thus formulated
in the first quarter of the Nineteenth Century did not anticipate the
more generous admission of party autonomy in Europe after the in-
dustrial revolution, both in England as the result of a series of enlight-
ened decisions founding the proper law theory, and on the Continent
notably as a result of Savigny's influence, but that the doctrine in-
troduced by Kent and Story remained so long untouched.
Whatever the causes-the plausible authenticity, relative sim-
plicity, and flexibility of the doctrine, which found a limited place
for intention, and the prestige of its authors, the recession that seems
to have occurred in legal scholarship during the latter part of the
Nineteenth Century, or perhaps the sheer indisposition of the Ameri-
can legal profession to reconsider basic legal theory-there was no
serious critique of the established doctrine for some seventy-five years.
Hence, it would be otiose for our purpose to review such summaries
of the law applicable to contracts as appeared, for example, in Par-
sons' Law of Contracts,7 in which the doctrine was merely sketched,
but with a doubt whether the law of the domicil instead of that of
the place of contract should not determine contractual capacity; or
in Wharton's interesting but incoherent Treatise on the Conflict of
Laws (1872), proposing to establish a comparative system primarily
on the basis of the "philosophic system of jurisprudence" that had
grown up in Germany, without however adverting to the import of
Savigny's contribution as respects autonomy in choice of law; or even
in Minor's Conflict of Laws (1901), in which, propounding a novel
triple conception of separate situs for the making, consideration, and
performance of a contract, the principle of autonomy was in effect re-
jected on the ground that the intention of the parties cannot validate
a domestic contract "declared by the law to be contrary to public poli-
cy and void."'" This assumed that foreign contracts should be gov-
17 Vol. II, (Boston, 1855).
18 At page 364, § 154. The passage continues:
"It seems manifest that the same principles should govern contracts possessing a
foreign element. If the contract is declared void in some particular element (such as
the mode of entering into it, the act to be done in performance of it, or the act done
as a consideration for the promise) by the law governing that element, comity and
justice unite in demanding that the courts of every State should uphold the law and
19551
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erned in this respect by the same principles as domestic-which is of
course the question-and, as Minor observed, since parties normally
do not state the law to govern their contracts, the final result is to
refer to the law of the situs of each element of the contract, whether
or not dependent upon their intention. This fragmentation of foreign
contracts involves a curious inversion of the concept of situs, which,
introduced by Savigny on the ground of intention to locate volun-
tary acts in space, acquires an objective existence in Minor's view
and as such practically suppresses the significance of intention.
IV. BEALE AND THE RESTATEMENT
ALTHOUGH this ingenious, if esoteric, partition of contract in terms
of situs does not appear to have been influential, the basic assumption
that choice of law is an attribute of sovereignty soon inspired a far
more redoubtable critique of the classic doctrine that each contract
is generally governed by a single law of the place of contract or of
performance. Proceeding on ancient historic lines to vindicate what
in his view should be rendered unto Caesar, in 1909 Beale published
the first of a famous series of articles on "What Law Governs the
Validity of a Contract," 19 summarizing the results of a fresh exami-
nation of the American decisions on the topic. He found them en-
veloped in the greatest confusion, due to failure to distinguish ques-
tions of validity from questions of performance, which he ascribed to
Story's failure to make the distinction in his treatment of these ques-
tions, a confusion originating in the complete acceptance by Story of
Lord Mansfield dictum in Robinson v. Bland, ° the Ions et origo
of the doctrine of intention as the criterion of the law applicable to
foreign contracts. Observing that this doctrine was declared on the
authority of Huber and Voet, Beale excoriated Lord Mansfield, in a
passage unparalleled in American legal literature, for introducing a
practice of turning to civil-law authors as "not one which has tended
policy of the State where the particular element arises or has its situs. The fact that
the parties had in view a different law as governing the element in question should
have no more influence in this case than in the case of the purely domestic con-
tracts above considered."
19 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 79, 194, 260 (1909). See also the later review of the
decisions as of 1935 in: 2 Beale, TREATisE ON T= CoNmcCT O LAws, 1100 (New York,
1935).
20 2 Burr. 1077, 97 Eng. Rep. 717 (1760); 1 Bl. V. 234, 236, 96 Eng. Rep.
129, 130 (1760).
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to preserve the correctness and purity of the common law."'" The fact
is that, on Beale's own showing, the judicial decisions reviewed at the
time substantially supported Story's doctrine,22 while the confusion
that he discovered in the cases was largely due to the prepossessions
with which he had undertaken to count them. In other words, Beale
did not accept the composite alternative rule as formulated by Story,
referring to the place of contracting or the place of performance and
grounded in tacit assent, as a single proposition. He assumed that all
contracts must be subject to law selected on the same principles and
therefore dissected the composite rule into three mutually exclusive
rules, applying, respectively, the law of the place of contracting, or of
performance, or that intended by the parties, to foreign contracts.
Such a dogmatic construction, which basically misconceived the mat-
ter, could not but view the cases, analyzed in terms of their dicta, as
confused.23  That such was the case is illustrated by his citation
of the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, in Carnegie
v. Morrison (1841)24 as holding that it is positive law, "concurring
with and giving effect to the act of the parties which determines the
nature and extent of a contract,"2 5 and as such the first voice to be
heard thus repudiating the principle of Story. The truth is that the
opinion quite faithfully reported the principle, and the decision in the
case was on the ground that, in the absence of express or tacit refer-
ence in the instrument to the law of England as the place of per-
formance, the general rule of the lex loci contractus should apply.
This, it may be observed, was an exact application of the principle,
as it had initially been formulated by Kent.
21 Beale, What Law Governs Validity of a Contract?, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1909).
22 See Beale, op. cit. supra, at 207. Lorensen (SELETrED ARTICLES ox CONLicT
OF LAWS, 262 (New Haven, 1947), thus summarized Beale's findings:
". .. that at the time of writing six states, one of which was doubtful, had
adopted the law of the place of making; that 16 states, of which five were doubtful,
had adopted the law of the place of performance; and that 11 states, besides the
District of Columbia, had adopted the law intended by the parties. The federal
courts have generally applied the law of the state or country intended by the par-
ties."
In the later review in 2 Beale, Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 1100, 1173
(New York, 1935), the intention theory is stated to be the prevailing tendency, with
a recent trend toward the lex loci contractus doctrine for questions of validity, fol-
lowing the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws.
23 This has been cogently pointed out by Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Con-
tracts: Cases Versus Restatement, 51 Yale L. J. 893, 900 (1942).
24 2 Met. 381 (Mass., 1841).
25 Beale, op. cit. supra, note 21, at 10.
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The prime difficulty, which led Beale in the face of the general
trend of authority to distinguish questions of validity of contract so
as to exclude reference to the parties' intention, was metaphysical. It
was apparently impossible for him to conceive that conflicts law
could logically allow private individuals to order their affairs by ref-
erence to a law by them chosen for the purpose:
"The fundamental objection to this in point of theory is that it
involves permission to the parties to do a legislative act. . . . The
adoption of a rule to determine which of several systems of law shall
govern a given transaction is in itself an act of the law.... Now, if
it is said that this is to be left to the will of the parties to determine,
that gives to the parties what is in truth the power of legislation so
far as their agreement is concerned. The meaning of the suggestion,
in short, is that since the parties can adopt any foreign law at their
pleasure to govern their act, that (sic) at their will they can
free themselves from the power of the law which would otherwise
apply to their acts."
This theoretical argument, supported by questionable considera-
tions of expediency, is the basis of Beale's system, which in principle,
subject to the usual exceptions in favor of the lex fori, applies to each
act the law of its place: to the contract the law of the place of making,
to acts of performance (which, as Cook has reminded us, may never
occur or consist in mere omissions) the law of the place where they
are to occur. This is a most venerable doctrine, which dates at least
back to Bartolus (whose writings on conflict of laws, it will be re-
called, Beale edited), and which, as has been said, he believed "to be
the only rule possible in a rational legal world. '2 7 This rigid and doc-
trinaire system has been followed by the Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws, for which Beale, as the leading American authority,
had justly been chosen as reporter, and has been approved by Judge
Goodrich,28 who nevertheless has more recently also referred to the
provision for express choice of law by the parties in the proposed
Uniform Commercial Code with approbation.2 1 In sum, Beale's doc-
trine had no place for party autonomy, and, in consequence, the Re-
26 Id. at 260-261.
27 Goodrich, Yielding Place to New: Rest Versus Motion in the Conflict of
Laws, 50 Col. L. Rev. 881, 898 (1950).
28 HANDBOOK OF = CoNIrmcr OF LAWS, 332 (3d ed. St. Paul, 1949). Cf. Kuhn,
COCPARATIVE COMMENTARIES ON PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAW OR CONFLICT OF LAWS,
282 (New York, 1937).
29 Goodrich, op. cit. supra, note 27, at 896.
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statement does not mention the most widely accepted principle of the
law of foreign contracts, even in the United States.
V. MODIFICATION IN DOCTRINE BY LORENZEN AND STUMBERG
TEN years after Beale, the topic was instructively reviewed by
Lorenzen on a broader comparative basis in a series of articles, which
are particularly valuable as indicating the general acceptance in the
various legal systems of the conception of intention to determine the
law applicable to foreign contracts.3 ° Nevertheless, Lorenzen con-
curred in Beale's primary argument, stating that "So far as it applies
to the validity of contracts the intention theory does not admit of a
theoretic defence. The validity or invalidity of a legal transaction
should result from fixed rules of law which are binding upon the par-
ties. Allowing the parties to choose their law in this regard involves
a delegation of sovereign power to private individuals."3 1 In view of
the practical advantages of the intention theory, after a review of
the possible alternatives, Lorenzen therefore proposed, de lege fer-
enda, that the intrinsic validity of a contract should be admitted if
the local law of any state with which the contract has a substantial
connection is satisfied, unless (a) execution is prohibited by a strin-
gent policy of the place of contracting or (b) performance is illegal
under the law of the place of performance. On the other hand, the
"effects" of a contract, in Lorenzen's view, should be subject to the
law chosen by the parties and, if their intention is not expressed, de-
termined in accord with a series of special rules of construction,
32
which he formulated.
Stumberg, writing in 1937, advocates an analogous solution, but
without necessary compliance with imperative requirements of the law
of the place of contracting, as Lorenzen had conceded. After review-
ing the supposed confusion in the decisions as envisaged by Beale and
Lorenzen, he advocates that the law that will uphold the contract
should be applied, "if the contract has some bona fide substantial
3o Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30
Yale L. J. 565 (1920-21); 31 Id. at 55 (1921). Reprinted in id., SEcmnD ARTiCLES
ox TE CoNELICT or LAWS, 261 ff. (New Haven, 1947).
31 Lorenzen, op. cit. supra, note 30, at 282.
32 Id. at 298, 321. Reference should also be made to the valuable comment by
Parker, Free Will in Conflict of Laws, 6 Tulane L. Rev. 454 (1932), relating par-
ticularly to the law of Louisiana.
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connection with the place of that law. 833 He does not support this on
the ground of the intention of the parties as such, but on the ground,
supported by the usury cases, that it would better serve business con-
venience, "in carrying out the purposes which the parties had in view
in their negotiations," to make "their acts legally, that which they pur-
port to be; i.e., an enforceable promise. 34 Indeed, to the argument
of Beale, accepted by Lorenzen, that the intention principle is theo-
retically indefensible as permitting "the parties to do a legislative act,"
Stumberg resorts to a plea in avoidance: (a) that the courts do not
in fact give effect to the intention of the parties but to the law deter-
mined by the circumstances of the contract or by a policy to validate
contracts; but (b) "even if the parties were permitted to choose their
own law, there should be no real objection if the results are good.""6
VI. CooK-ExPRESSED INTENTION
IN the notable series of articles in which Cook undertook to ex-
amine the conflicts law of the United States, particularly as formu-
lated in the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, among the
most penetrating are those concerning the law applicable to con-
tracts.3 6 With his usual acumen, Cook devoted the two principal con-
tributions on this topic to the chief arguments for Beale's system,
incorporated in the Restatement, as against the generally accepted
principle of party autonomy: namely, certainty in determination of the
applicable law and the contention that to base such determination on
the intent of the contracting parties would permit them "to do a legis-
lative act." On the first and important practical consideration, the
analysis presented by Cook is not directly relevant to the present
discussion;37 it fairly demonstrated that the inconsistencies in the
Restatement rules respecting the place of contracting and its failure
to provide a logical distinction between matters subject to the law of
the place of contracting and those governed by the law of the place
of performance, rigidly and widely defined, were not merely unsup-
ported by authority but would inevitably breed further confusion and
uncertainty.
83 Stumberg, PRINcIPLEs oF CONF CT OF LAWS, 240 (2d ed., Brooklyn, 1951).
84 Ibid.
85 Id. at 377, n. 49.
36 These articles, originally appearing from 1924 to 1939 in various law reviews,
have been published, with supplementary comments, in Cook, Tim LOGICAL AND LEGAL
BASES OF Tmn CoNFCT OF LAWS (Cambridge, Mass., 1942).
37 Op. cit. supra, note 33 at 347 ff.
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The second of these contributions, 8 concerned with the "inten-
tion" of the parties, is immediately germane to our problem; this
characteristically proceeds straight to the basic issue-the assumption
of Minor, Beale and Lorenzen that, to give effect to the intention of
the parties in determining the "validity" of their contracts, constitutes
a delegation of the sovereign power to legislate for which there is no
theoretic justification. In refutation, dealing first with the theory al-
lowing choice of law by express agreement, Cook points out, in the
first place, that, to prove what these writers assumed, it would be
necessary to show that private individuals are not permitted to "make
law" for themselves in this manner, viz., by agreement to alter the
rights that they would otherwise have under the general rules of law.
But, as he readily shows by a variety of illustrative doctrines in other
branches of law, this is not so; there are many "pliable" or faculta-
tive rules of law that individuals are allowed to vary by agreement.
A second argument seeks to show that choice of law by the par-
ties is not an act of legislation; this is predicated upon the local law
theory, the extreme application of the lex fori as the basis of conflicts
law, developed by Cook. In terms of this theory, the intention of
the parties that the contract should be governed by a certain foreign
"law" does not mean that the foreign law is, as it were, imported to
supplant the local legislator, but only that "the parties agree that to
the factual transaction now before the forum there are to be applied
the rules of decision found in that part of the 'law' of the foreign state
or country in question which is applicable to purely domestic trans-
actions. These rules the parties incorporate merely as one term of
their agreement.13 9 On this second argument, it may be pointed out
that there is a distinction, not noted by Cook, between such "incor-
poration" of foreign legal provisions and autonomy in choice of law,
as these terms are commonly understood; under the former concep-
tion, to which the most violent opponents of the autonomy principle
do not object, such provisions are agreed upon as they stand at the
time of agreement, while the latter conception of party autonomy is
commonly taken to contemplate that the provisions of the foreign legal
system selected, as they may subsequently develop, shall govern. It
does not appear that this should necessarily have troubled Cook; in
38 Id. at 389 ff.
39 Id. at 399 ff.
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his view, conflicts law is a relativistic vacuum, the content of which
is determined from time to time, as justice or expediency may sug-
gest, by the local sovereign.' In view of Cook's rejection of any
limitation, under the rules of international law, upon the lex Jori, it
is difficult to understand why the parties could only "incorporate"
the terms of foreign law in their agreement, or in other words, why
it would be impossible for them also to import foreign law as such,
under authority delegated by the lex Jor. Thus, while Cook's evi-
dence that rules of conflict law do not have to be mandatory appears
conclusive, his second argument in the end supports Beale's postu-
late that choice of law is a legislative act for which only a territorial
sovereign is competent. The only difference is that, in the local law
theory, this must be the sovereign of the place of suit.
Having thus established the possibility of reference to the express
intention of contracting parties as a criterion of choice of law, Cook
proceeds to define the limits of possibility. The first, already noted,
is that such reference is construed as "incorporation"; "The 'rules of
law' of the foreign state in question take effect not as 'law' of that
state but merely as terms of the agreement of the parties."'" In ac-
cordance with this construction, the reference is only to the "domestic"
rules of the chosen foreign state, not to the conflict of laws rules
(avoiding possible renvoi), but the parties may exclude by express
provision in their agreement certain of such "domestic" rules (admit-
ting depegage). A second possible limitation, not logically necessary
but offered as perhaps expedient, is that the foreign law agreed upon
by the parties to regulate the contract should have some substantial
connection with the transaction-this on the grounds that such restric-
tion would lessen the burden upon the court of ascertaining foreign
law in cases where it is not materially relevant and reduce the "like-
lihood that the selection made by the parties would infringe upon the
'public policy' of the states with which the transaction has substantial
connections."42 Third, Cook's incisive observations on the argument
that the intention theory promotes evasion of the proper law, tend to
suggest that, in his view, the general exception of public policy makes
a special rule on "evasion" unnecessary. It may be remarked that,
40 Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Comp. Law
297, 314 ff. (1953).
41 Op. cit. supra, note 36, at 400.
42 Id. at 412.
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of the above qualifications, the principle of "incorporation" is de-
signed, consistently with the local law theory, to avoid giving effect
to the foreign law adopted by the parties as law, while the require-
ment that such law should have a substantial connection with the
transaction is to that extent an admission that the public policies of
foreign states with which the transaction is so connected have claims
to be respected on grounds of "international (or inter-state) comity,"43
or in other words a cryptic concession to the notion that public policy
may engender vested rights.
Even with the reservations intimated above, it is apparent that
Cook's discussion of party autonomy was a significant advance; it
effectively refuted the basic theoretic objection that choice of law is a
species of legislation and as such not allowable to private parties. In
other cases, where the intention of the contracting parties respecting the
applicable law is not expressly or otherwise clearly indicated, he per-
tinently proposed, first, that the choice of law should depend upon the
requirements of particular types of transactions, instead of endeavor-
ing to include the great variety of matters covered by the law of
contracts in a single rigid system of rules, as attempted in the Re-
statement; and, second, that in default of such specific treatment, it
would be more candid to determine the law of each contract by refer-
ence to the state with which the transaction has the most substantial
connection than under a cumbersome resort to the "presumed inten-
tion" of the parties. Thus, Cook ultimately concluded that a combina-
tion of the "expressed intention" theory as outlined above with the
"proper law" theory would give the needed flexibility and at the same
time allow "adequate consideration and weighing of all the social and
economic factors in the situations presented for consideration.1
44
VII. GENERAL ACCEPTANCE IN UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE
TIs critique opened the door to consideration of the intention
of the parties as a central criterion in adjudicating foreign contracts.
The chief subsequent contributions have been comparative; while not
directly apposite in this account of the doctrine in the United States,
they deserve notice in passing. In the first place, they again empha-
size the widespread acceptance of the doctrine of party autonomy in
43 Id. at 426.
44 Id. at 431.
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other countries, and the consequent anomalous position of the Re-
statement as respects this topic; in the second place, they provide an
invaluable basis for the necessary reconsideration of the conflicts law
respecting contracts in the United States.
The first of these contributions is Nussbaum's penetrating review
of the Restatement theories of contracts, which appeared in 1942.7
In addition to confirming the time-honored importance of "the idea
that the law governing a contract must principally be ascertained
from the express or implied common intention of the parties,"4 and
its universal acceptance by the courts, this article provides further
demonstration of the doctrinaire rigidity of the Restatement rules
and their variance from the judicial precedents. Indeed, in accord
with Batiffol, it is observed that the American cases, starting from
the doctrine of Kent and Story, though perhaps theoretically less
refined than those developed in Europe, "stand out for simplicity and
practical-mindedness." 47 In general, the courts in the United States,
following the traditional doctrine, have sought "to discover the law
of the place to which the most important contacts of the contract
go,";48 which is the solution recommended by Nussbaum as well as
Batiffol.
The second and leading survey of the subject appeared in 1947,
in the second volume of Rabel's comparative survey of conflicts
law.49 This magistral examination of the general theories respecting
contracts not only should remove any remaining doubt as to the sig-
nificance of intention in the determination of the law applicable to
foreign contracts, but it also sets forth a liberal conception of party
autonomy, with an exhaustive examination of the countervailing theo-
ries, precedents, and considerations, the details of which cannot be re-
produced here but must be left to the interested reader to discover
in the treatise. Briefly speaking, Rabel's view is that, despite objec-
tions by some writers, there is practically no doubt that the parties to
a contract expressly or tacitly may agree upon the law by which their
contract is to be governed, such agreement being a true contract and
45 Op. cit. supra, note 23. Cf. also, Nussbaum, PiNciPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 157 ff. (New York, 1943).
46 Id. at 895.
47 Id. at 922.
48 Id. at 923.
49 2 Rabel, Tm CoNmerLc or LAws; A ComPARATEvE STUDY, 357 ff. (Ann Arbor,
1947).
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itself subject to the law of the principal contract. With respect to the
limitations upon party autonomy, it is shown that the chief conflicts
laws do not recognize any imperative rules as governing a priori; that
the idea that the law agreed upon must have some substantial rela-
tion to the contract has proved fallacious; that proposals to avoid
evasion of law are generally acceptable only in cases where all the
substantial contacts are with a single legal system; and that, in cer-
tain types of cases, such as the usury and insurance cases, appropriate
compromises are desirable between the applicable foreign law and the
public policy of the forum, the claims of which, however, should not
be exaggerated. Finally, it is recommended, subject to optional refer-
ence to the principle locus regit actum to validate transactions as re-
spects form, that each contract should be generally governed by a
single law, or in other words that depeqage should be avoided. In cases
where the parties have not agreed upon the law of the contract, Rabel
urges, as indeed had been proposed by Cook, that careful study be
made of specific categories of contracts on a comparative basis, so as
to provide the courts with a detailed system of rules, defining the most
significant connection of each group of contracts in conformity with
the needs of international commerce, as the basis for choice of the
applicable law. The third volume of Rabel's treatise on Conflict of
Laws, published in 1950, is chiefly devoted to an examination of the
more important types of international transactions with this in view.
Since then, leaving aside a seemingly isolated article by Kron-
stein,50 accentuating the public order of the territorial sovereign as the
basis and end of law and in effect proposing the abolition of conflicts
law, including the intention theory, on the ground that it enables
parties to pursue their private desires (which indeed is its just pur-
pose!), reference should be made, in addition to the survey referred
to at the outset,5 ' to the study by Bayitch, published in 1953,52 of
the various theories respecting "the connecting agreement" and its
effects, as well as the problems arising in the aiplication of the law
agreed upon, with extensive citations to the literature and cases.
50 Crisis of 'Conflict of Laws,' 37 Geo. L. J. 483 (1949).
5: op. cit. supra, note 1.
52 The Connecting Agreement, 7 Miami L. Q. 293 (1953). Also published in
Spanish, with additions, as Law autonomia de las partes en la eleccidn del derecho
aplicable a los contratos, 7 Boletin del Instituto de Derecho Comparado de Mexico,
40 (1954). See also the earlier article by the author, The Connecting Contract, 3 Ca-
hiers de Frontenex (Genbve, 1947).
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Also in 1953, an apparently original and social-minded proposal
was made in an article by Ehrenzweig,13 that in so-called "adhesion
contracts" choice of law by agreement of the parties should be ex-
cluded. Noting that exceptions have been made to the application of
the law stipulated by the parties in certain employment cases on du-
bious grounds, the author points out that these difficulties would be
obviated by avoiding such stipulations by the parties in cases where
inequality of bargaining power has resulted in the imposition of an
unfair legal provision upon the employee. An adequate discussion of
this interesting thesis, which bears a certain resemblance to the ten-
dency in certain branches of law, notably insurance, to protect indi-
viduals who improvidently or without real opportunity to bargain
enter into unfavorable contracts against unreasonable provisions,
would involve a detailed discussion of the specific types of transac-
tions concerned, an enterprise beyond the limits of this paper. Pro-
visionally, however, it may be suggested that the general exception
of public policy would seem to provide a more flexible and sufficient
means to strike "unconscionable" terms in employment and analogous
types of contracts. For one thing, the fact that a particular provision
of the law agreed upon may be unjust, by no means implies that the
application of such law as the general law of the contract may not in
other respects be desirable. Moreover, the argument is weakened by
qualifications, first, that the proposed exemption should not apply as
between corporations, and second, that provisions in "contracts of ad-
hesion" favoring the employee should be enforced. Moreover, while
the standardization of certain transactions by governmental regulation
may preclude agreement of the parties to deviate from such regula-
tion, in ordinary cases it would seem that to ascertain whether a con-
tract should be classified as an "adhesion contract" should depend
upon an individual study of the particular transaction rather than
upon some classification difficult to define in gross. All this suggests
that to except "adhesion contracts" from the general rule of party
autonomy would introduce an unduly rigid and unnecessary compli-
cation to provide for occasional cases of hardship. For such cases,
the exception of public policy, supplemented by legislation when the
instances are not merely occasional, is a flexible and recognized means
of adjustment.
53 Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 Col. L. Rev. 1072 (1953).
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VIII. NEED TO REVISE PRESENT CONFLICTS RULES
IN conclusion, it seems clear that, in the vast area of commercial
transactions and contracts in particular, the conflict of laws doctrines
in the United States have suffered, in the first instance, from pre-
occupation with the supposed claims of territorial sovereignty, and in
the second place, from the absence in the long period from Story
until quite recently of sufficient scientific and comparative study of
the subject matter. For the subsequent development, it was in a sense
unfortunate that the American system of conflicts law concerning
contracts, was so excellently established by Story at such an early
date, as compared with the English for example; still more so, that it
so long stood unchallenged, unaffected by developments in other legal
systems; and yet still more, that, when it was ultimately subjected to
critical review after three quarters of a century, the nascent terri-
torial bias in Story's composite formulation should have been select-
ed, out of all its components, in the face of the weight of the authori-
tative precedents, and with insular indifference to how the laws of
other countries affecting international commerce were progressing, in
the Restatement of this subject. From this point of view, it is for-
tunate that Cook's criticisms have opened the way to reconsider the
premises and that various comparative studies of the topic provide a
source of light for those who are inclined to do so.
If the a priori claims of territorial sovereignty are -not given
precedence, if in other words it is understood that the purpose of law
and government is to serve practical needs, not to bend these needs
to abstract visions of territorial or societal supremacy, and that the
activities in which individuals engage do not occur by virtue of au-
thority vested in that mysterious entity that we call the State, but as
a part of community existence, it may be perceived, as suggested at
the outset, that the basic principle in the law of contracts is to afford
the needed protection to the transactions of individuals in accordance
with their intentions. The contracts of individuals are a social phe-
nomenon, not creations of the territorial sovereign; this confuses the
legal remedy with the object of relief. Recognition of this need in
international transactions is the source of the doctrine of party au-
tonomy in conflicts law. Accordingly, the basic premise of the law of
foreign, as of domestic, contracts is that the agreement of the parties,
including their'intention respecting the law to govern the agreement,
1955]
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should be given legal sanction, except as there are good reasons to
the contrary.
Assuredly, as Cook has shown, the objection that choice of law
involves a "legislative act" is not such a reason; indeed, this argu-
ment would make government impossible, for the state can act only
by the agency of individuals! In the light of the foregoing account
of the American doctrines, it may be suggested that the exceptions to
be made to the primary principle of party autonomy as respects con-
tracts can simply be stated in terms of two sufficiently inclusive and
flexible categories: first, cases in which in all substantial respects, ex-
cept as to the law agreed upon by the parties, the contract is related
to a single legal system and violates its mandatory requirements;
second, cases in which there are well-founded objections on the ground
of public policy. This will include questions of procedure, rationally
limited to the real necessities of judicial administration, standardized
transactions subject to governmental regulation precluding choice of
another law, cases where the contract is unconscionable or otherwise
is veritably repugnant to the security or moral standards of the forum
as declared in its laws. In the absence of agreement, express or tacit,
of the parties on the law to govern the contract, it seems appropriate
to apply the rules of the legal system to which the transaction is most
substantially related; in determining such connection, however, as
Cook and Rabel have proposed, instead of prescribing general rules to
cover the variety of matters under the contract umbrella, it is highly
expedient that the rules should be defined in terms of the needs of
particular types of business.
Hope that the rules of the conflict of laws in the area of con-
tracts may be subject to reformulation in the United States, is lent
by two recent developments. The first is the inclusion in Section
1-105 of Article 1, of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code of the
provision:
"(6) Whenever'a contract, instrument, document, security or
transaction bears a reasonable relationship to one or more states or
nations in addition to this state the parties may agree that the law of
any such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.
In the absence of an agreement, which meets the requirements of
this subsection, this Act governs."
Whatever be thought of the callous intendment of the preceding
subsections of Section 1-105 that the lex fori should extend the bene-
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fits of the Code to the whole world, except when the parties refuse
the boon, its disregard of the most elementary considerations of pri-
vate international law, and the egregious solecisms that have been
remarked in its formulation,"4 the fact that in the first instance par-
ties are hereby allowed to agree upon a law bearing a reasonable rela-
tion to the transaction to "govern their rights and duties," is of great
interest in the present connection as an express formulation of the
principle of party autonomy, proposed for adoption as uniform legis-
lation. Inasmuch as the American Law Institute has participated in
the preparation and sponsorship of the Code, it would be appropriate
for the Institute to revise the Restatement of the Law of Conflict
of Laws in the light of the more modern and, as the above survey has
shown, more correct and expedient formulation enabling the parties
to select the law for their transactions, incorporated in the Code. In-
deed, barring the second sentence in the Subsection, it needs only
retouching.
The second occurrence, which in certain respects is even more
significant, is the reference in the highly enlightened opinion rendered
by the late Justice Jackson, speaking for the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the recent case of Lauritzen v. Larsen in 1953,15 to
the principle of party autonomy. The decision in this case turned on
the relatively narrow question as to whether the Jones ActO0 should
be applied so as to provide relief, in accordance with the statutes of
the United States, to a Danish seaman, injured in Havana harbor,
who while temporarily in New York had joined the crew of a ship of
Danish flag and registry, owned by a Danish citizen. The claimant
had signed ship's articles, written in Danish and providing that the
rights of the seamen should be governed by Danish law and by the
employer's contract with the Danish Seaman's Union, of which the
claimant was a member. The question was not whether the contract
should generally be governed by Danish law but, more precisely,
whether an exception thereto should be made on account of the
public policy of the United States, as declared in the Jones Act. In
the course of an admirable precise analysis of the connecting factors
present in the case, and after pointing out that the claim sounded in
tort, Justice Jackson stated:
54 See notably the article by Riheinstein, Conflict of Laws in the Uniform Com-
inerdia Code, 16 Law & Conternp. Prob. 114 (1950).
rr 345 U. S. 571, 73 S. Ct. 921, 97 L. Ed. 1254 (1953).
n6 37 Stat. 200, c. 250, § 2 (1912), 46 U. S. C. § 488.
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"The place of contracting in this instance, as is usual to such
contracts, was fortuitous. A seaman takes his employment, like his
fun, where he finds it; a ship takes on crew in any port where it
needs them. The practical effect of making the lex loci contractus gov-
ern all tort claims during the service would be to subject a ship to a
multitude of systems of law, to put some of the crew in a more ad-
vantageous position than others, and not unlikely in the long run to
diminish hirings in ports of countries that take best care of their
seamen.
"But if contract law is nonetheless to be considered, we face the
fact that this contract was explicit that the Danish law and the con-
tract with the Danish union were to control. Except as forbidden
by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in con-
tract matters the law which the parties intended to apply. We are
aware of no public policy that would prevent the parties to this
contract, which contemplates performance in a multitude of territorial
jurisdictions and on the high seas, from so settling upon the law of the
flag-state as their governing code. This arrangement is so natural
and compatible with the policy of the law that even in the absence
of an express provision it would probably have been implied. The
Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 367; The Hanna Nielsen, 273 F. 171. We
think a quite different result would follow if the contract attempted
to avoid applicable law, for example, so as to apply foreign law to an
American ship."57
This passage, recognizing again the principle stated by Chief Justice
Marshall in 1825 "that in every forum a contract is governed by the
law, with a ,view to which it is made,""' appears to resolve any doubts
that might survive from older dicta, concerning the propriety of ad-
mitting agreement of the parties to determine the law of their con-
tract in proper instances in the Supreme Court of the United States,
and as such further to justify reconsideration of this subject matter.
57 Supra note 55 at 588-9, 73 S. Ct. at 931, 97 L. Ed. at 1271.
58 Supra, note S.
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